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ISSUES PRESENTED
I. Whether the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed summary judgment
in Romero’s erroneous claim of intrusion upon seclusion based upon
third party, LEETDUDE’s observation of Romero’s fictional avatar
and virtual mansion.
II. Whether the district court correctly denied Romero’s request for a
default judgment or adverse inference as a sanction under Rule 37 of
the Marshall Rules of Civil Procedure.
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OPINIONS BELOW
In case number 07 CV 5309, the Cyrus County District Court
granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee, Windbucket Entertainment, LLC. In case number 4-08-0315, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals of the State of Marshall affirmed the district court’s order granting
summary judgment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review of a lower court’s grant of summary judgment is de novo. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The
evidence must show no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Marshall R. Civ. P. 56(c).
The standard of review of a lower court’s grant of sanctions is for
abuse of discretion. Halaco Eng’g Co. v. Costle, 843 F.2d 376, 379 (9th
Cir. 1988). A reversal is appropriate only upon a showing of clear error.
Id. Findings of fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard.
Id.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I. Statement of the Facts
Appellee, Windbucket Entertainment, LLC (“Windbucket”), is in the
business of developing and publishing computer games. (R. at 4.) After
successfully publishing several single-player computer-based role-playing games, Windbucket entered the multi-player online gaming market
in 2002. (R. at 4.) Windbucket’s most successful multi-player online
game is Eden, which has amassed a significant player base, numbering
into the millions of players. (R. at 4.) In Eden, players create fictional
characters (or “avatars”). (R. at 4.) Avatars may amass virtual property
in the form of land, starships, and virtual money or credits, which can be
used within the game. (R. at 4.)
Windbucket charges a monthly subscription fee and requires all
players to agree to its Terms of Use Agreement (“Agreement”) before engaging in the game. (R. at 4.) The Agreement establishes that “[a]ll
rights and title in and to the Program and the Service . . . are owned by
Windbucket or its licensors.” (R. at 8.) Although the “Rules of Conduct”
in the Agreement state that players “may hold expectations of privacy in
their conduct and affairs conducted in the Game,” it also makes it clear
that “Windbucket reserves the right to modify [the] ‘Rules of Conduct’ at
any time[.]” (R. at 9-10.) Furthermore, Windbucket “reserves the right,
at its sole and absolute discretion, to change, modify, add to, supplement
or delete any of the terms and conditions . . . at any time.” (R. at 9-10.)
The Agreement thus allows Windbucket to add features to Eden pro-
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vided that material changes are disclosed to players. (R. at 10.) However, Windbucket determines what constitutes a material change at its
“sole and absolute discretion.” (R. at 10.)
Given the highly competitive nature of the online computer gaming
market, Windbucket must constantly update Eden in order to maintain
player interest. (R. at 5.) Since the release of Eden, Windbucket has
used its discretion to experiment with features designed to promote subscriber retention. (R. at 4.) Such features include “Zero Being” mode and
“Voyage-Enhanced Unrecognizability” (“Voyeur”) mode. (R. at 5.) Under
Zero Being mode, players who stopped paying monthly subscription fees
experienced functionality reductions in their avatars. (R. at 4.) Zero Being mode made avatars “invisible, unable to interact with other participants, accumulate virtual property or credits[.]” (R. at 4.) Players
eventually began to intentionally allow their avatars to reach Zero Being
mode so that they could spy on other avatars. (R. at 4.) Some players
also established a website, entitled “Zombies of Eden,” to discuss what
they observed while their avatars were in Zero Being mode. (R. at 4.)
Because Zero Being mode failed to retain subscriber interest,
Windbucket eventually discontinued the feature in July 2006. (R. at 4.)
Following its failed attempt with Zero Being mode, Windbucket created Voyeur mode to again attempt to increase subscriber retention. (R.
at 4.) Like Zero Being mode, Voyeur mode permitted avatars to become
invisible and included an additional feature allowing for avatars to instantaneously travel to any point in Eden. (R. at 4.) Windbucket eventually discontinued Voyeur mode in November 2007. (R. at 5.)
Appellant, Alex Romero (“Romero”), is a subscriber to Eden and has
played Eden since its release in 2005. (R. at 5.) During the course of his
gaming, Romero created an avatar, “PWNED,” obtained a significant
amount of virtual money, virtual property, created a virtual gated community and leased virtual homes to other players. Romero also built a
virtual mansion for PWNED. (R. at 5.)
In July 2006, a player known only by the avatar name “LEETDUDE,” activated Voyeur mode for his account. (R. at 5.) On or before
November 30, 2007, unbeknownst to Windbucket, LEETDUDE posted
various screen shots taken from LEETDUDE’s Voyeur mode game sessions on the Zombies of Eden website. (R. at 5.) Included in the screenshots were images from Romero’s virtual mansion, including a
screenshot of PWNED’s master bedroom and a screenshot of six or seven
avatars engaging in what appear to be sexual acts in front of PWNED’s
virtual mansion. (R. at 5.) Romero subsequently filed a complaint
against Windbucket and LEETDUDE, alleging that the two were liable
for an invasion of his privacy. (R. at 5.)
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II. Preliminary Statement
On December 27, 2007, Romero filed a lawsuit against Windbucket
and LEETDUDE, asserting a claim for intrusion upon seclusion. (R. at
5.) At that time, Romero also served Windbucket a discovery request
seeking the identity of LEETDUDE. (R. at 5.) In response, Windbucket
informed Romero that it permits players to pay for Eden via credit card
or prepaid cards and does not require players using prepaid cards to
enter identifying information. (R. at 5-6.) Because LEETDUDE paid
with a prepaid card, Windbucket could not ascertain LEETDUDE’s identity. (R. at 6.)
Following Windbucket’s disclosure, Romero subsequently submitted
additional discovery requests, seeking Windbucket’s server authentication logs for September, October and November 2007, so that it could
identify LEETDUDE’s internet service provider and identity. (R. at 6.)
Because of a trade secret Windbucket did not produce the logs. (R. at 6.)
Romero subsequently obtained a discovery order, compelling production
of the logs. (R. at 6.) Windbucket’s attorneys failed to respond to the
discovery order. (R. at 6.) However, after Romero requested a second
discovery order, Windbucket produced authentication logs for the web
server. (R. at 6.) Because Romero desired the server authentication
logs, he requested a third discovery order, to which Windbucket produced its game server authentication logs for December 2007 and January 2008. (R. at 6.)
Following Romero’s request for discovery orders, the district court
proceeded to order Windbucket to produce the server logs for September,
October and November 2007 or show cause for why it was not possible.
(R. at 6.) Windbucket responded that as a result of its data retention
policy it no longer retained the logs. (R. at 6.) Windbucket’s Data Retention Policy, dated November 2004, stated that older log files “may be are
pruned.” (R. at 14.) In actual practice, Windbucket only maintains logs
for two months because of technology limitations associated with maintaining the logs longer. (R. at 6, 13.) Windbucket updated its Data Retention Policy in February 2008 to reflect that practice. (R. at 6.)
Windbucket maintains internet game server traffic logs for a limited
time for the limited purpose of diagnosing customer issues and tracking
server utilization. (R. at 13.) Thus Windbucket was unable to comply
with the district court’s discovery order. (R. at 6.)
Based on Windbucket’s failure to comply with the court’s discovery
orders and the fact that Windbucket no longer had the requested logs,
Romero moved for sanctions under Rule 37 of the Marshall Rules of Civil
Procedure. (R. at 6.) Specifically, Romero requested that the court
render a default judgment against Windbucket on his invasion of privacy
claim, or in the alternative, enter an order directing that Windbucket’s
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participation in the alleged invasion of privacy be taken as established
for purposes of the action. (R. at 6.) The district court denied the motion
for sanctions but ordered Windbucket to pay reasonable expenses caused
by its inability to obey the discovery orders. (R. at 6.)
Windbucket subsequently moved for summary judgment on the invasion of privacy claim on the basis “that Romero did not suffer an actionable invasion of privacy and that Windbucket could not be held liable
for the acts of a third party.” (R. at 6.) The district court granted
Windbucket’s motion on that basis and dismissed. (R. at 6.)
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals granted Romero’s petition for
review of the district court opinion granting summary judgment and its
denial of his motion for sanctions. (R. at 6.) The circuit court affirmed
the district court’s summary judgment decision on the basis that a fictional avatar cannot be a victim of invasion of privacy. (R. at 7.) The
circuit court also affirmed the district court’s denial of Romero’s motion
for sanctions on the basis that any error was harmless since Romero did
not “suffer any actionable invasion of privacy.” (R. at 7.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Viewed in the light most favorable to Romero, the undisputed facts
do not raise a genuine issue of material fact that Romero stated a claim
for intrusion upon seclusion. Furthermore, there is no evidence that
Windbucket’s actions constituted such egregious conduct that would
warrant greater sanctions than those levied by the district court. Therefore, Windbucket respectfully requests this Court affirm the lower
court’s decision.
I.
This Court has recognized the tort of intrusion upon seclusion as
stated by the Restatement (Second.) Thus, Romero must prove the following elements: (1) Windbucket intentionally intruded into Romero’s
seclusion without authorization; (2) Windbucket intruded upon a private
matter; (3) the intrusion was highly offensive to a reasonable person,
and; (4) the intrusion caused Romero mental or physical anguish and
suffering. Romero failed to prove all of the elements.
Windbucket did not commit an intentional intrusion, according to
the Restatement. In order to prove an intentional intrusion, Romero
must prove that Windbucket committed an affirmative act, constituting
an actual intrusion. Section 652(B) of the Restatement does not recognize claims for reckless or negligent intrusions. Because Romero failed
to demonstrate any affirmative act constituting an actual intrusion on
the part of Windbucket, he failed to prove an intentional intrusion. Furthermore, before engaging in Eden, Romero voluntarily signed an agree-
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ment, which allowed Windbucket to alter the game, including the
creation of Voyeur mode. Romero’s voluntary acceptance of such an
agreement further negates a finding of an intentional intrusion. Even if
the Court finds an intentional intrusion occurred, it was committed by
third-party, LEETDUDE. Windbucket is not liable for an intrusion committed by LEETDUDE since Romero failed to prove Windbucket provided substantial or material assistance to LEETDUDE.
Romero did not prove a reasonable expectation of privacy existed in
Eden or that a highly offensive intrusion occurred. First, Romero could
not establish a subjective expectation of privacy in Eden because he
should have known LEETDUDE’s actions were possible. Even if Romero
had a subjective expectation of privacy in Eden, he failed to demonstrate
that society would recognize his expectation as reasonable. Because
Eden is essentially a public forum in which Romero voluntarily participated and communicated with unknown parties, he could not establish a
reasonable expectation of privacy. Lastly, Romero failed to show that a
reasonable person would find spying on a fictional character strongly objectionable, thereby precluding a finding of “highly offensive” behavior.
Romero cannot show that the alleged intrusion proximately caused
the requisite anguish and suffering. The facts indicate that any harm
resulted from LEETDUDE’s postings on the Zombies of Eden website
and not from the intrusion itself. Thus, the alleged intrusion and any
harm suffered by Romero are only remotely linked.
II.
Romero has failed to demonstrate that Windbucket’s actions were so
egregious that a default sanction or an adverse inference are warranted.
In determining whether a default sanction is appropriate, courts should
consider: (1) willful delay; (2) whether the moving party was prejudiced;
(3) whether the party affected by the sanction was warned that a default
sanction was possible; and (4) whether less drastic sanctions were first
imposed or considered.
Windbucket did not willfully delay the proceedings. To warrant a
default sanction the fault must be that of the party, not his attorney.
Windbucket’s initial delays were caused by its attorney’s mistake, not by
willful conduct. Furthermore, Romero is not prejudiced because the
identity of LEETDUDE is a peripheral matter and does not affect the
merits of Romero’s action against Windbucket. Additionally, there is no
evidence on the Record that the district court warned Windbucket of the
possibility of a default sanction. Finally, the district court, in its considerable discretion, chose to issue a monetary sanction as an alternative
sanction.
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An adverse inference instruction is also inappropriate. An adverse
inference is only warranted when the following three conditions are all
met: (1) the party with control over the evidence had an obligation to
preserve it; (2) the records were destroyed with a culpable state of mind;
and (3) the missing evidence is relevant to the party’s claim. Windbucket
has a reasonable retention policy and maintained the policy without any
reason to believe the evidence would be relevant. Furthermore,
Windbucket acted in good-faith when it removed old internet logs. Finally, Romero did not produce sufficient evidence that a reasonable trier
of fact could find the identity of LEETDUDE relevant to Romero’s intrusion upon seclusion claim against Windbucket.
Even if the district court should have imposed sanctions, any error
was harmless because Romero does not have a valid claim for intrusion
upon seclusion. For these reasons, this Court should affirm the decision
of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and dismiss Romero’s action.
ARGUMENT
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals correctly affirmed summary
judgment for Windbucket. Summary judgment is appropriate when no
genuine issue of material fact exists. Marshall R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex,
477 U.S. at 322-23. Romero has not shown that a genuine issue of material fact exists in his claim for intrusion upon seclusion. Summary judgment is also required when a party fails to establish a necessary element
of his claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. The record demonstrates that Romero did not state a claim for intrusion upon seclusion. Furthermore,
Romero’s request for a default sanction or adverse inference is not warranted under the facts of this case. The Record does not indicate that
Windbucket’s actions were so egregious as to warrant a default sanction
or adverse inference. Thus, Windbucket requests that this Court affirm
the decision of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.
I. THE APPELLATE COURT PROPERLY AFFIRMED SUMMARY
JUDGMENT BECAUSE ROMERO FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM
FOR INTRUSION UPON SECLUSION
Privacy, as a legal right, is part of the bundle of rights that enjoy
preferred status in the legal system’s hierarchy of rights. The right to
privacy safeguards the most intimate aspects of an individual’s life, including his “private life, habits, acts, and relations . . . .” Samuel D. Warren & Lou Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 215
(1890). Tort law’s “invasion of privacy,” originally coined by William
Prosser, includes the four common law privacy torts intended to protect a
plaintiff’s right “to be left alone.” William Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal. L.
Rev. 383, 389 (1960). Prosser’s first tort, intrusion upon seclusion, pro-
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tects a plaintiff’s right to solitude in his private affairs. Id. at 389-92.
The intrusion tort is triggered when a defendant uses illegal or unreasonable means to discover private aspects of a plaintiff’s life. Id. at 38990. However, as with all legal rights, the right to seclusion is not absolute. Shorter v. Retail Credit Co., 251 F. Supp. 329, 330 (D.S.C. 1966).
The right to seclusion is a “qualified right[,]” Id., and recognizes that
no one can expect to live in an “ivory tower[,]” completely free from other
members of society. Voneye v. Turner, 240 S.W. 2d 588, 590 (Ky. 1951).
To bring a successful claim for intrusion upon seclusion, a plaintiff must
demonstrate an intentional intrusion, into his solitude or seclusion, for
which a reasonable person would be highly offended. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652(B) (1977). Insensitive, annoying, or insulting conduct
does not impose liability. Nagy v. Bell Tel. Co., 292 Pa. Super. 24 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1981).
Application of the intrusion tort on the Internet is unclear. However, plaintiffs face an uphill battle when attempting to establish claims.
Online information is usually not considered “private,” since it is often
provided voluntarily. Christopher F. Carlton, The Right to Privacy in
Internet Commerce: A Call For New Federal Guidelines and the Creation
of an Independent Privacy Commission, 16 St. John’s J.L. Comm. 393,
423 (2002). Moreover, claims for invasion of “private matters” are farfetched considering online virtual worlds are “artificial, fictitious, imaginary, intangible, and invented[.]” Jack M. Balkin & Beth Simone
Noveck, The State of Play: Law, Games, and Virtual Worlds 3 (2006).
Several limiting principles define the common law intrusion tort and
prevent it from becoming an all-encompassing constantly litigated assertion of an individual right. Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of
Privacy, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 957, 1008 (1989). Thus, to bring a proper claim
for intrusion upon seclusion, Romero must have pled and proved the following elements: (1) Windbucket, without authorization, intentionally
intruded or pried into Romero’s seclusion; (2) that the intrusion was
highly offensive or objectionable to a reasonable person; (3) that the matter intruded upon was private; and (4) that the intrusion caused anguish
and suffering. Miller v. Motorola, Inc., 560 N.E.2d 900, 904 (Ill. App. Ct.
1990). Failure to prove any element of the tort necessarily destroys the
claim. Bank of Indiana v. Tremunde, 365 N.E. 2d 295, 298 (Ill. App. Ct.
1977). Because Romero failed to establish every element of the intrusion
tort, his claim was properly denied on summary judgment.
A. ROMERO FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM BECAUSE WINDBUCKET DID NOT
INTENTIONALLY INTRUDE OR PRY INTO ROMERO’S SECLUSION
Claiming intrusion upon seclusion requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant intentionally intruded upon a plaintiff’s pri-
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vacy. Knight v. Penobscot Bay Med. Ctr., 420 A.2d 915, 918 (Me. 1980).
A defendant’s act is “intentional” when he acted willfully, either desiring
to commit the intrusion, or knowing that the intrusion would likely occur. Snakenberg v. Hartford Casualty Ins. Co., 383 S.E.2d 2, 6 (S.C. Ct.
App. 1989). An “intrusion” occurs when the defendant acted “without
invitation, permission, or welcome[,]” in invading the plaintiff’s privacy.
Mauri v. Smith, 929 P.2d 307, 311 (Or. 1996). Therefore, to establish an
“intentional intrusion,” the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant desired to intrude or was substantially certain that his conduct
would result in the unauthorized exposure of the plaintiff’s private matters. Acuff v. IBP, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 2d 914, 924 (C.D. Ill. 1999); See also
O’Donnell v. United States, 891 F.2d 1079, 1083 (3d. Cir. 1989). An “intentional intrusion” does not occur when the defendant believed that he
had “the necessary legal or personal permission to commit the intrusive
act[.]” O’Donnell, 891 F.2d at 1083.
1. Windbucket Did Not commit an Intentional Act as Required by the
Restatement (Second) § 652(B)
An intentional intrusion, occurs when the defendant commits an “affirmative act” that constitutes an actual intrusion. Kane v. Quigley, 203
N.E.2d 338, 340 (Ohio 1964). A defendant is not guilty of an intrusion for
“unintended conduct amounting merely to a lack of due care.”
Snakenberg, 383 S.E.2d at 7. Additionally, to impose liability for a thirdparty’s intrusion, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant provided
substantial or material assistance to the third-party. Le Crone v. Ohio
Bell Tel. Co., 201 N.E.2d 533, 536 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963).
Simple knowledge of a third-party’s intrusion does not establish the
“affirmative act” required to constitute an intentional intrusion. Nix v.
Hoke, 139 F. Supp. 2d 125, 133 (D.D.C. 2001). In Nix, the plaintiff argued that the defendant, a congressman, was guilty of an intrusion because he knew that his constituents installed a wiretap on the plaintiff’s
phone line. Id. at 130. Even though the plaintiff admitted that the defendant did not participate in the wiretapping, he argued that since the
defendant was aware of the wiretapping, did nothing to stop it, and
helped cover-up the activities after the fact, he was jointly liable for the
intrusion. Id. at 133. The court disagreed and held that the allegations
did not establish an intentional intrusion since the defendant neither
“participated” in nor “conducted” the wiretapping. Id.
Here, Romero failed to establish an intentional intrusion by
Windbucket. Even though Windbucket may have been aware of LEETDUDE’s actions, it did not act intentionally since it did not commit any
affirmative act contributing to the alleged intrusion by LEETDUDE. Assuming an actionable intrusion even occurred, it was committed by
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third-party, LEETDUDE, and not by Windbucket. (R. at 5.) The Record
establishes, and Romero does not dispute, that LEETDUDE, a thirdparty and subscriber to Eden, acted alone in activating Voyeur mode. (R.
at 5.) The Record also demonstrates that LEETDUDE acted alone when
infiltrating Romero’s virtual mansion. (R. at 5.) Even if Windbucket was
aware of LEETDUDE’S actions, knowledge without participation does
not establish a claim for intrusion upon seclusion. See Nix, 139 F. Supp.
2d at 133. Without showing any affirmative action by Windbucket, Romero’s claim for intrusion upon seclusion must fail.
i.

Section 652(B) of the Restatement Does Not Permit Claims for
Reckless or Negligent Intrusion Upon Seclusion

To suggest that the intrusion tort may be committed recklessly or
negligently would enlarge the tort beyond the confines of the Restatement. Bailer v. Erie Ins. Exch., 687 A.2d 1375, 1381, n.4. (Md. 1997).
The Restatement explicitly requires that a defendant act “intentionally”
in order to be liable for an intrusion. Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 652(B) (1977). Therefore, if the evidence demonstrates that the intrusion was unintentional, any claim for an intrusion must fail. See McCormick v. Haley, 307 N.E.2d 34, 38 (Ohio Ct. App. 1973).
Only one court has affirmatively held that a defendant may be liable
for a negligent intrusion. See Prince v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., 484
N.E.2d 265, 269 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985). In Prince, the court interpreted an
Ohio Supreme Court decision that defined “intrusion upon seclusion” as
“the wrongful intrusion into one’s private activities in such manner as to
outrage or to cause mental suffering, shame or humiliation to a person of
ordinary sensibilities.” Id. at 268-69, quoting Housh v. Peth, 133 N.E.2d
340, 343 (Ohio 1956). Based on that language alone, the Prince court
concluded that the tort of intrusion upon seclusion did not require an
intentional intrusion. Id.
Romero incorrectly contends that Windbucket is liable for acting
negligently or recklessly in the alleged intrusion. (R. at 6.) The test used
in Prince, permitting a claim for a negligent intrusion, is incorrect. In
Prince, the appellate court interpreted Ohio common law decided in
1956. Id. Unlike the language used in Ohio common law, the Restatement explicitly requires intent, stating “[o]ne who intentionally intrudes . . . is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy[.]”
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652(B) (1977) (emphasis added). Section
652(B)’s use of “intentionally” is significant since there is no mention of
“intentionally” in the Restatement’s other three privacy torts. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652(C)-(E) (1977). By including “intentionally” in § 652(B) and omitting it in the other three sections, the
Restatement’s authors acted deliberately and purposefully. See Keene
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Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 (1993). Since there is no evidence that “intentionally” acquired any special meaning in § 652(B), it
must be afforded its ordinary meaning as defined by the Restatement.
See Nix v. Heddon, 149 U.S. 304, 306 (1893). The Restatement defines
“intentional” as acting with either the desire or with the knowledge that
a certain result will follow. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8(A) (1965).
Several other courts recognize negligent invasion of privacy, without
regard to the specific tort, as a valid cause of action. See Boyles v. Kerr,
806 S.W.2d 255, 259 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991). However, this is consistent
with the Restatement since, unlike the intrusion tort, the other three
privacy torts do not affirmatively require that the invasion of privacy be
intentional. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § § 652(C)-(E) (1977).
Section 652(B)’s requirement of intent is appropriately followed by Marshall courts, and accordingly, Romero’s arguments for a negligent or
reckless intrusion must fail.
ii. Windbucket Cannot be Liable for the Actions of Third-Party,
LEETDUDE, Because it Did Not Provide Substantial or
Material Assistance to Him
A defendant is liable for a third-party’s intrusion only when the
plaintiff can prove that the defendant provided substantial or material
assistance to the third-party, Le Crone, 201 N.E.2d at 536, or that the
defendant directly participated in the intrusion. Lucas v. Ludwig, 313
So. 2d 12, 15 (La. Ct. App. 1975). In addition, the plaintiff must first
prove an actionable invasion by the third-party. Le Crone, 201 N.E.2d at
537.
To find a defendant liable for a third-party’s intrusion, the court
must conclude that the defendant knowingly provided material assistance or abetted the third-party in the wrongful intrusion. Id. at 538. In
Le Crone, the defendant telephone company complied with a request by a
husband to attach an extension on his wife’s private telephone line. Id.
at 535. At the time of his request, the telephone company knew that the
couple was separated and living at different addresses. Le Crone, 201
N.E.2d at 538. The telephone company also knew that the telephone bill
was in the wife’s name and was paid for by her. Id. Moreover, the telephone company knew that the extension’s only possible use was to intercept phone calls. Id. at 540. Despite its knowledge of the situation
between the couple, the telephone company complied with the husband’s
request without notifying his wife. Id. The court found the telephone
company jointly liable for the intrusion, reasoning that it rendered material aid to the husband by knowingly providing him with a device to intercept phone calls, even though he had no control over his wife’s phone.
Id.
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In the case at bar, Windbucket did not knowingly provide material
assistance to LEETDUDE. Unlike the defendant telephone company in
Le Crone, Windbucket was not aware of any relationship between Romero and LEETDUDE that would indicate that Romero would not want
LEETUDE to intrude upon his virtual mansion. Furthermore, unlike
the extension in Le Crone, Voyeur mode’s sole purpose was not to intercept private communications. Players could activate Voyeur mode and
travel anywhere in Eden, not just into “private” areas. (R. at 4.) And
lastly, unlike the defendant in Le Crone, where the defendant knew that
its assistance would result in unauthorized intrusion, by simply creating
Voyeur mode, Windbucket could not predict that LEETDUDE would use
it to intrude Romero’s virtual mansion and take screen shots. Even if the
Court determines that LEETDUDE intruded upon Romero’s virtual
mansion, because Windbucket did not knowingly provide material assistance to LEETDUDE, it cannot be found liable as a third party.
In addition to providing material aid, a defendant may also be
jointly liable for an intrusion if the plaintiff can prove that the defendant
and third party pursued a common plan to commit the intrusion or that
the defendant actually participated in the intrusion. Clayton v. Richards, 47 S.W.3d 149, 154 (Tex. App. 2001). In Clayton, the court found
the defendant, a private detective, jointly liable with the plaintiff’s wife,
after he acted as her agent in setting up a videotaping system in the
couple’s bedroom. Id. at 154-55. Similarly, in Lucas, the court found an
attorney jointly liable for an intrusion when he acted with his client to
facilitate an unjustified police visitation to plaintiff’s premises. 313
So.2d at 15. Additionally, in Tompkins v. Cyr, the court found the defendants, who planned and orchestrated unprotected focused picketing
at plaintiff’s home, jointly liable for the intrusion, despite the absence of
their personal involvement in the picketing. 995 F. Supp 664, 684-85
(N.D. Tex. 1998).
Unlike the defendants in Clayton, Lucas, and Tompkins, there is no
evidence that Windbucket participated in LEETDUDE’s intrusion upon
Romero’s virtual mansion or even pursued a common plan to do so. Unlike the defendant in Clayton, Windbucket did not assist LEETDUDE in
his intrusion into Romero’s virtual mansion, and unlike the defendant in
Lucas, Windbucket did not facilitate LEETDUDE’s actions. Windbucket
simply created Voyeur mode to promote subscriber retention. (R. at 4.)
Unlike the defendant in Tompkins, Windbucket did not command or help
plan LEETDUDE’s intrusion. Aside from providing a subscription,
Windbucket had absolutely no contact with the party in control of LEETUDE. Based on the undisputed facts, Windbucket may not be found to
have pursued a common plan or participated in a plan with LEETDUDE,
and thus, may not be found jointly liable for the alleged intrusion.
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2. Windbucket Did Not Commit an Intentional Intrusion Since
it Believed its Conduct was Authorized
To find that an intrusion was “intentional,” the plaintiff must establish that the defendant believed, or was substantially certain, that he
lacked “the necessary legal or personal permission to commit the intrusive act.” O’Donnell, 891 F.2d at 1083. This requirement is derived from
the comments and illustrations of § 652(B) of the Restatement, which
demonstrate that an intentional intrusion involves a defendant who does
not believe he has the authority to commit the intrusive act. O’Donnell,
891 F.2d at 1083. Such illustrations include:
[A] photographer taking a picture of a hospital patient over her objection, a detective wiretapping a person’s phone or using binoculars to
view inside a private residence, a litigant using forged court papers to
examine bank records of the opposing party, and a person who, in an
effort to gain an audience with a prominent individual, refuses to desist
making harassing phone calls.

Id. at 1083, n.3, quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652(B) com. b,
illustrations 1-5 (1977).
Therefore, if the defendant can show that he reasonably believed he
had legal or personal permission to commit the intrusion, a claim for intrusion upon seclusion must fail. Id. at 1083.
In O’Donnell, the plaintiff authorized the Veteran’s Administration
Agency (VA) to release information to his employer showing that he suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). 891 F.2d at 1081. The
VA provided plaintiff’s employer with proof that plaintiff suffered from
PTSD and provided additional information detailing plaintiff’s anger
problems. Id. When the plaintiff alleged an intrusion, the court refused
to impose liability, holding that the VA did not intend to intrude upon the
plaintiff’s privacy since it believed that the plaintiff had provided it with
the “necessary legal or personal permission” to release his full treatment
summary. Id. at 1080-83.
Here, the Record demonstrates that Windbucket likely believed it
had the necessary legal or personal permission to enact Voyeur mode,
thereby permitting players to spy on other avatars. Before users subscribe to Eden, they are required to accept the Agreement. (R. at 4.) Included in the Agreement is a statement explaining that “[a]ll rights and
title in and to the Program and Service . . . are owned by Windbucket[.]”
(R. at 8.) Although the Agreement provides that users “may hold expectations of privacy in their conduct and affairs conducted in the Game[,]”
it also states that “Windbucket reserves the right to modify [the] Rules of
Conduct at any time.” (R. at 8.) Furthermore, Windbucket reserved “the
right, at its sole and absolute discretion, to change, modify, add to, supplement or delete any of the terms and conditions of [the] Agreement at
any time, including . . . the availability of any feature of the Program[.]”
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(R. at 10.) Thus, while the Agreement suggests that users may expect
some privacy in their gaming conduct, the Agreement makes it clear that
Windbucket is permitted to alter the terms and conditions of the Agreement at anytime. (R. at 10.)
As the owner of Eden, and with the sole discretion to alter the game
and Agreement signed by Romero, Windbucket may have reasonably believed that it had the legal and personal permission to modify the game,
thereby permitting conduct like LEETDUDE’s. Even though Romero invested his time in Eden, he voluntarily signed the Agreement acknowledging that Windbucket could alter the terms of the game at anytime.
Thus, the court should find that Windbucket acted with the belief that
Romero authorized it to enact Voyeur mode, thereby negating any possible finding of an intentional intrusion.
B. ROMERO FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM BECAUSE HE DID NOT HAVE
REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN HIS
VIRTUAL MANSION

A

Proof of an intentional intrusion alone is not enough to sustain a
claim for intrusion upon seclusion. The plaintiff must also prove that the
matter intruded upon is private. Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. Am.
Broad. Co., 306 F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir. 2002). To establish a matter as
“private,” the plaintiff must prove that he had a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the matter. Id. When the undisputed material facts
demonstrate that the plaintiff lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy, any claim for intrusion upon seclusion must fail. Deteresa v. Am.
Broad. Co., Inc., 121 F.3d 460, 465 (9th Cir. 1997).
When assessing whether a plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of
privacy, courts have borrowed the two-prong test used in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S., 347, 361 (1967).
The first prong requires that the plaintiff prove that he had “an actual,
subjective expectation of seclusion or solitude in the place, conversation,
or matter.” Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants, 306 F.3d at 812. The second
prong requires that the plaintiff demonstrate that his subjective expectation of privacy is “one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” Kemp v. Block, 607 F. Supp. 1262, 1264 (D. Nev. 1985). Without
proof of both subjective and objective expectations of privacy, a plaintiff
cannot demonstrate that the matter intruded upon is private, and a
claim of intrusion cannot succeed. Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants, 306
F.3d at 818-19.
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1. Romero Did Not Have a Subjective Expectation of Privacy in His
Virtual Mansion
A plaintiff may demonstrate a subjective expectation of privacy by
bringing forth any outward manifestations showing that he intended to
keep the matter private. Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants, 306 F.3d at 810.
The plaintiff’s actions must affirmatively prove that he intended to keep
the subject matter private. Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Ath. Ass’n, 865 P.2d
633, 655 (Cal. 1994). The court may also compare what precautions the
plaintiff took to safeguard his privacy interest against what precautions
he may have reasonably taken. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 749
F.2d 307, 312-13 (6th Cir. 1984). Therefore, it is essential that the court
assess what actions the plaintiff took in attempting to keep a subject
matter private. Id.
Evidence showing the plaintiff knew that his communications or
other conduct could be intercepted negates any claim that the plaintiff
had a subjective expectation of privacy in the matter. Chandler v. State,
680 So. 2d 1018, 1034-35 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996). For example, in Kemp,
the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that he had a subjective expectation of
privacy in a workplace conversation when he failed to take any action to
keep the conversation private and knew that other employees could hear
it. Kemp, 607 F. Supp. at 1264. Similarly, in State v. Delaurier, the
court held that the plaintiff could not claim a subjective expectation of
privacy in his phone calls since his phone came with a manual alerting
him that conversations could be intercepted by others. 488 A.2d 688, 694
(R.I. 1985).
The Record demonstrates that Romero should have been aware that
LEETDUDE’s conduct was possible. Voyeur behavior was not foreign to
Eden since it previously occurred during the existence of Zero Being
mode. Although Windbucket eventually discontinued Zero Being mode,
the fact that Windbucket reserved the right to alter the game at anytime
should have put Romero on notice that such conduct could occur again.
The fact that Romero should have been aware of the possibility that another player might spy on him, must destroy any claim that Romero had
a subjective expectation of privacy in his avatar’s virtual mansion.
A plaintiff may not claim a subjective expectation of privacy when
evidence demonstrates that he consented to the intrusion. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 892(A)(1) (1979) (“[o]ne who effectively consented to conduct of another intended to invade his interests cannot
recover in an action of tort for the conduct or for the harm resulting from
it”). Moreover, plaintiffs cannot claim subjective expectations of privacy
when the source they claim privacy in is outside of their control. Christopher F. Carlton, The Right to Privacy in Internet Commerce: A Call For
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New Federal Guidelines and the Creation of an Independent Privacy
Commission, 16 St. John’s J.L. Comm. 393, 423 (2002).
Here, Romero’s conduct demonstrates that he relinquished any expectation of privacy he may have desired in his online fantasy life,
thereby negating any finding of a subjective expectation of privacy. In
voluntarily signing the Agreement, Romero “agree[d] that [he had] no
right or title in or to any content that appears in the program[.]” (R. at
10.) Since this clause granted all ownership to Windbucket, including
his virtual mansion, Romero cannot contend that he had an expectation
of privacy in a matter outside his control. See Carlton, supra at 423.
Moreover, Romero’s voluntary acceptance of the Agreement granted consent to Windbucket to alter the game. Such action is inconsistent with
any subjective expectation of privacy in the game. See Hill, 865 P.2d 633,
658-59.
2. Even if Romero Subjectively Believed He Had an Expectation of
Privacy in His Virtual Mansion, That Belief was Not Objectively
Reasonable
Even if the court finds that Romero had a subjective expectation of
privacy in his virtual mansion, this would not be enough to establish that
he had a reasonable expectation of privacy. “No community could function if every intrusion into the realm of private action, no matter how
slight or trivial, gave rise to a cause of action for invasion of privacy.”
Hill, 865 P.2d at 660. Therefore, when assessing a plaintiff’s subjective
expectation of privacy, the court must also determine whether that expectation was objectively reasonable. Id. This requires that the plaintiff
demonstrate that a reasonable person would share his expectation. Id.
To determine whether this prong has been satisfied, the court must determine whether the plaintiff’s expectation of privacy is “one that society
is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” Kemp, 607 F. Supp. at 1264.
A reasonable expectation of privacy depends on “broadly based and
widely accepted community norms[.]” Hill, 865 P.2d at 655. Therefore,
what is considered reasonable necessarily depends on “the normal standard of community behavior.” F. Harper & F. James, The Law Of Torts
§ 16.2 (1956). “[I]t is only where [an] intrusion has gone beyond the limits of decency that liability accrues.” Hamberger v. Eastman, 206 A.2d
239, 242 (N.H. 1964).
Courts have generally been unwilling to find reasonable expectations of privacy in places that are open to the public, Fogel v. Forbes, Inc.,
500 F. Supp. 1081, 1087 (E.D. Pa. 1980), or in information which the
plaintiff voluntarily provided. Dwyer v. American Express Co., 652
N.E.2d 1351, 1354 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995). Furthermore, courts have refused
to find reasonable expectations of privacy in matters that are not inher-
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ently “private.” Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants, 306 F.3d at 814. Therefore, because Romero’s virtual mansion was part of a game, and arguably
not “private” at all, the court may determine that he lacked an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy on that basis alone.
In the context of the Internet, courts have refused to find reasonable
expectations of privacy in online chat rooms and e-mail messages sent to
their intended recipients. United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 419
(C.A.A.F. 1996); United States v. Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177, 1185
(S.D. Ohio 1997). In Maxwell, the court explained that although the
sender of an e-mail message may enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy in a message, that expectation is destroyed as soon as the recipient
receives the message because the sender no longer controls the message’s
destiny. 45 M.J. at 418. Similarly, in Charbonneau, the court held that
the plaintiff did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in an online
chat room since he could not predict what individuals who received his
“chats” might do with the messages. 970 F. Supp. at 1185. By participating in Eden, a multi-player online game, Romero undoubtedly interacted with other parties. Romero could not predict what those parties
might do with the information they received from him. Such interactions
with unknown parties necessarily destroy any reasonable expectation of
privacy that Romero may have claimed. See Maxwell, 45 M.J. at 419; See
also Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. at 1185.
A finding that the plaintiff or his “private matters” were in a public
place destroys any claim of a reasonable expectation of privacy. Fogel,
500 F. Supp. at 1087. The comments and illustrations to the Restatement § 652(B) explicitly reject imposing liability for intrusions that occurred in public view. Restatement (Second) Torts § 652, cmt. c (stating,
there is no liability “for observing [plaintiff] or even taking his photograph, while he is walking on the public highway, since he is not here in
seclusion, and his appearance is public and open to the to the public
eye . . .”).
Here, given the public nature of Eden, Romero cannot demonstrate
that he had an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in his virtual mansion. By their very nature, virtual worlds are considered public
places, “intended for [their] users to inhabit and interact via avatars.”
Wikipedia, Virtual World, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_ world
(last visited Sept. 12, 2008). Essentially, members interact as a “community.” Id. In Eden players interact by fighting against one another, conducting business, and trading online property. (R. at 4.) Given the
public nature of Eden, even if Romero subjectively believed his conduct
was private, he cannot establish that such a belief was objectively
reasonable.
Courts have also refused to find reasonable expectations where
plaintiffs have voluntarily provided information. Shawn C. Helms,
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Translating Privacy Values with Technology, 7 B.U.J. SCI. & TECH. L.
288, 310 (2001). In Dwyer, the plaintiffs alleged that the company intruded upon their privacy when it collected and rented their personal
information to third-parties. 652 N.E.2d at 1353. The court found that
the plaintiffs did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information since they had voluntarily provided it. Id. at 1354.
Even when defendants have assured parties that data will not be
intercepted, courts have refused to find reasonable expectations of privacy where plaintiffs voluntarily provided information. See Smyth v.
Pillsbury, 914 F. Supp. 97, 98 (E.D. Pa. 1996). In Smyth, the defendant
company maintained an internal electronic mail communication system
to promote corporate communications between its employees. Id. The
company repeatedly assured its employees that communications would
not be intercepted. Id. Despite these assurances, the company subsequently intercepted employee plaintiff’s private messages. Id. Finding
that the employee plaintiff voluntarily made these communications on
the company system, the court held he did not have had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in those messages. Id. at 100-01.
Like the plaintiffs in Dwyer and Smyth, Romero cannot establish
that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his virtual mansion
since he voluntarily participated in Eden. Although the Agreement
states that users “may hold expectations of privacy in their conduct and
affairs[,]” (R. at 9), the court’s holding in Smyth, demonstrates that this
does not affect the voluntary nature of Romero’s participation. Because
Eden is essentially a public forum in which Romero voluntarily participated in and communicated with unknown parties, this Court should refuse to find that Romero had an objectively reasonable expectation of
privacy in his virtual mansion.
C. ROMERO FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM BECAUSE THE ALLEGED
INTRUSION WAS NOT HIGHLY OFFENSIVE
Even if the Court determines that Romero had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his virtual mansion, Romero would still need to prove
that the alleged intrusion was highly offensive. In order to avoid excessive litigation, an actionable intrusion of privacy must be “sufficiently
serious in [its] nature, scope, and actual or potential impact[,]” so as “to
constitute an egregious breach of the social norms underlying the privacy
right.” Hill, 865 P.2d at 655. Such a determination is made by assessing
social conventions and expectations. PETA v. Bobby Berosini, Ltd., 895
P.2d 1269, 1281 (Nev. 1995). Although the offensiveness of an intrusion
is a question of fact, because most cases are determined on summary
judgment, the court is necessarily involved in this determination. See
Carter v. Innisfree Hotel, Inc., 661 So. 2d 1174, 1178 (Ala. 1995).
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To determine the “offensiveness” of an intrusion, courts consider
several factors, including: the degree of the intrusion, the context, conduct and circumstances surrounding the intrusion, the intruder’s motives and objectives, and the expectations of those whose privacy is
invaded. Miller v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 187 Cal. App. 3d 1463, 1483-84 (Cal.
App. 1986).
Merely annoying, disruptive or insulting conduct does not rise to the
level of “highly offensive” conduct as required by the intrusion tort. See
Christie v. Greenleaf, 1951 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 119 (Pa. C.P.
1951). The illustrations and comments to the Restatement (Second)
§ 652(B) demonstrate that, in order to constitute a “highly offensive” intrusion, the plaintiff must prove an exceptional kind of prying, such as:
(1) taking a photograph of a woman with a rare disease in a hospital over
her objection, or (2) using a telescopic lens to take intimate pictures in
another’s bedroom. Therefore, a defendant was not found liable when he
made the plaintiff “the butt of billingsgate, harsh names and insulting
gestures[,]” Id., or where the defendant created a spoof portraying plaintiff’s sex life with her husband. Stein v. Marriot Ownership Resorts, Inc.,
944 P.2d 374, 379 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
LEETDUDE’s actions did not rise to the level of an exceptional kind
of prying and thus may not be considered “highly offensive” conduct. In
making its assessment, the Court must consider the context in which the
alleged intrusion took place. See Miller, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 1483-84.
Thus, this Court must determine what constitutes “highly offensive” conduct in the context of an online game. Eden is a fictitious world where
users voluntarily enter for fun and games. See Wikipedia, Virtual
World, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_world (last visited Sept. 12,
2008). The fact that Romero voluntarily entered Eden to participate in a
fantasy world goes against finding the alleged intrusion highly offensive,
as most individuals would likely conclude that such conduct was simply
part of the game. See Aisenson v. Am. Broad. Co., 220 Cal. App. 3d. 146
(Cal. App. 1990). In the gaming world, LEETDUDE’s posting of the
screenshots from Romero’s virtual mansion may amount to insulting
conduct, but it cannot be ignored that the conduct took place in the context of a game. Moreover, given that such conduct previously occurred in
Eden, it is possible that such behavior is commonplace in online fantasy
worlds, thereby negating any finding that the conduct is “highly
offensive.”
When assessing what constitutes “highly offensive” conduct, courts
must also consider the intruder’s motive or reason for engaging in the
intrusive action. Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants, 306 F.3d at 819. In
Medical Laboratory Management Consultants, a group of undercover reporters posed as potential business partners and surreptitiously videotaped a private conversation with an employer’s lab technician and
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broadcast portions of the conversation to the general public. Id. at 814815. Finding that the defendants had a “noble motive[,]” reporting on
important health issues that could potentially impact millions of women,
the court refused to find that the deception constituted “highly offensive”
conduct. Id. at 819.
Here, Windbucket’s motive behind enacting Voyeur mode was legitimate, as Windbucket enacted it as a means of promoting subscriber retention rather than as a means to engage in unauthorized intrusions.
(R. at 4.) Such a motive must serve to negate a finding that
Windbucket’s conduct was highly offensive. Because Romero voluntarily
entered Eden and LEETDUDE’s alleged intrusion did not constitute
highly offensive conduct, Romero’s claim for intrusion upon seclusion
was properly denied.
D. ROMERO FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT ANY ANGUISH AND
SUFFERING WAS SUFFICIENTLY SERIOUS OR THAT IT WAS
PROXIMATELY CAUSED BY THE ALLEGED INTRUSION
Even if all three elements of the intrusion upon seclusion tort are
satisfied, the plaintiff must still prove that the claimed harm was proximately caused by the defendant’s conduct. Tompkins, 202 F.3d at 782.
Moreover, the plaintiff’s claimed harm must rise to a level that constitutes serious mental or physical injury. Shorter v. Retail Credit Co., 251
F. Supp. 329, 332 (D.S.C. 1966). Because the intrusion tort is specifically
aimed at the discomfort caused by the intrusion itself, Thomas v. Pearl,
998 F.2d 447, 452 (7th Cir. 1993), the plaintiff must show that the substantial harm flowed directly from the intrusion itself. Schmidt v. Ameritech Illinois, 768 N.E.2d 303 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
The intrusion tort focuses on the manner in which the defendant
obtains information and is not concerned with what the defendant later
does with the information. Fernandez-Wells v. Beauvais, 983 P.2d 1006,
1010 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999). The basis of the tort is neither publication
nor publicity. Id. Therefore, in interpreting § 652(B) of the Restatement, the majority of courts have refused to consider the defendant’s
subsequent publication of information obtained during an alleged intrusion in considering whether the plaintiff plead the requisite harm. Med.
Lab. Mgmt. Consultants, 306 F.3d at 1191. Instead, courts require that
the plaintiff demonstrate that the harm flowed directly from the intrusion itself, such as when a defendant enters the plaintiff’s bedroom, Byfield v. Candler, 125 S.E. 905 (Ga. Ct. App. 1924), opens the plaintiff’s
mail, Birnbaum v. United States, 588 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1978), or makes
repeated and unwanted telephone calls to the plaintiff. Harms v. Miami
Daily News, Inc., 127 So. 2d 715 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
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Failing to establish the requisite link between the alleged harm and
the intrusion destroys any claim for intrusion upon seclusion. Lovgren v.
Citizens First Nat’l Bank, 534 N.E.2d 987 (Ill. 1989). In Lovgren, the
plaintiff argued that he suffered mental anguish when uninvited thirdparties arrived at his home after the defendant placed an unauthorized
advertisement regarding plaintiff’s home in a local newspaper. Id. The
court denied the plaintiff’s intrusion claim, finding that the resulting
harm sprung not from any intrusion, but from the defendant’s publication. Id. at 988. In Schmidt, the plaintiff argued that he suffered mental
harm when his employer fired him after inspecting his private phone
records. 768 N.E.2d at 306. The court denied plaintiff’s intrusion claim,
finding that the mental harm suffered was proximately caused by the
loss of the plaintiff’s job rather than from the intrusion itself. Id. at 31617.
Romero does not bring forth any evidence of harm he suffered as the
result of LEETDUDE’s entry into Romero’s virtual mansion. Here, the
only harm that Romero may demonstrate is the harm he may have suffered as the result of LEETDUDE’s subsequent posting of images on the
Zombies of Eden website. (R. at 5.) Such harm did not flow from the
intrusion itself; rather, it resulted from LEETDUDE’s subsequent publication. Thus, Romero cannot demonstrate a harm flowing directly from
the alleged intrusion itself.
In addition to establishing that the harm flowed directly from the
intrusion itself, the plaintiff must also prove that the intrusion caused
substantial mental or physical injury. O’Shea v. Lesser, 416 S.E.2d 629,
633 (S.C. 1992). This requires that the plaintiff prove actual injury by
way of medical care, an inability to sleep or work, or a loss of reputation
and integrity in the community. Schmidt, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 316. The
court will not presume injury. Id. In O’Shea, the plaintiffs alleged that
they suffered substantial harm when the defendants violated a restrictive covenant by erecting an extension, thereby permitting them to see
into a portion of the plaintiffs’ home. O’Shea, 416 S.E.2d at 630. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that as a result of the defendants’ ability to
see into their home, they were forced to change their lifestyle so as to
avoid being watched by the defendants. Id. The court held that the fact
that the plaintiffs had to change their lifestyle did not constitute serious
mental harm. Id. at 633. In its holding, the court noted that “[p]eople
who live in organized communities must of necessity suffer some inconvenience and annoyance from their neighbors . . .” Id.
In the case at bar, Romero has failed to demonstrate that he suffered
substantial physical or mental anguish. In O’Shea, the court refused to
find substantial mental anguish when the plaintiffs were forced to
change their lifestyle due to the defendants being able to see into their
actual home. Id. at 633. Any intrusion into Romero’s virtual mansion
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certainly does not rise to the level of harm suffered by the plaintiffs in
O’Shea. Because Romero cannot demonstrate that he suffered substantial mental harm flowing directly from the intrusion itself, his claim for
intrusion upon seclusion was properly denied.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals properly affirmed summary
judgment because Romero failed to state a claim for intrusion upon seclusion. First, Romero cannot demonstrate that Windbucket intentionally invaded his privacy since any alleged intrusion was made by a third
party, LEETUDE. Because the Restatement (Second) § 652(B) does not
recognize claims for reckless or negligent intrusions, Romero may not
succeed on any such theory. Moreover, Windbucket cannot be shown to
have committed an intentional intrusion since it may have reasonably
believed it had Romero’s consent to alter the contours of the game. Second, Romero cannot demonstrate that he had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his virtual mansion, given that Windbucket was the sole
owner of Eden and that virtual worlds are generally considered public
forums. Third, Romero could not prove that spying on a fictional avatar
constituted highly offensive behavior. And finally, Romero failed to
plead the requisite anguish and suffering because any possible harm resulted from LEETDUDE’s posting on the Zombies of Eden website, not
from the alleged intrusion. Moreover, any such harm could not rise to
the necessary level of substantial mental or physical anguish. Therefore,
Windbucket respectfully requests that this Court affirm summary
judgment.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
ROMERO’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS.
Under Marshall R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2), courts may sanction parties who
fail to comply with discovery orders. Freeland v. Amigo, 103 F.3d 1271,
1276-77 (6th Cir. 1997). Courts have broad discretion in fashioning appropriate sanctions for failure to produce evidence. Residential Funding
Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2002). Dismissal
or default sanctions are the most severe sanctions and should only be
ordered in extreme situations. Carter v. City of Memphis, 636 F.2d 159,
161 (6th Cir. 1980). Absent an extreme situation, a default sanction is
an abuse of discretion and the court must choose a lesser sanction. Id.
Because of expense and technological limitations, it has become
Windbucket’s policy to maintain Internet game server traffic logs for
only two months before deleting them. (R. at 13.) Windbucket maintains logs for a limited period of time in order to diagnose customer issues and track server utilization. (R. at 13.) Neither of those purposes
would justify the massive expense of maintaining old game server traffic
logs.
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The original Data Retention Policy from November 2004 provided
for the pruning of older logs, but failed to specify exactly how long the
logs were maintained before they were pruned. (R. at 14.) Accordingly,
Windbucket amended its Data Retention Policy in February 2008 solely
to clarify its existing practice. (R. at 13.) Windbucket updated its Data
Retention practices only to reflect current practice. (R. at 6.)
Windbucket acted in good faith in maintaining its logs for a limited purpose and for as long as technologically feasible. Thus, arguably,
Windbucket should not be sanctioned at all.
A. THE FAILURE TO MAINTAIN INTERNET SERVER TRAFFIC LOGS
SEVERE ENOUGH TO WARRANT A DEFAULT SANCTION

IS

NOT

Dismissal or default sanctions are “draconian” penalties which
should be applied only in extreme situations. Barnhill v. United States,
11 F.3d 1360, 1367 (7th Cir. 1993). Courts differ slightly in the test they
use to determine whether a sanction of default or dismissal is appropriate. The various factors are designed to further the “strong policy favoring a trial on the merits and against depriving a party of his day in
court.” Fox v. Studebaker-Worthington, Inc., 516 F.2d 989, 996 (8th Cir.
1975). The most commonly considered factors are: (1) willful delay; (2)
whether the moving party was prejudiced; (3) whether the party affected
by the sanction was warned that further failure could result in a default
sanction; and (4) whether less drastic sanctions were first imposed or
considered. Freeland v. Amigo, 103 F.3d 1271, 1277 (6th Cir. 1997); Adriana Intl. Corp. v. Lewis & Co., 913 F.2d 1406, 1412 (9th Cir. 1990); Ball
v. City of Chicago, 2 F.3d 752, 755-58 (7th Cir. 1993); Poulis v. State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863, (3rd Cir. 1984) (considering
factors 1, 2 and 4 and the meritoriousness of the claim).
Because Marshall R. Civ. P. 37 is based on Fed. R. Civ. P. 37, Marshall courts should follow the Federal Courts’ interpretation of Fed. R.
Civ. P. 37. Such action is consistent with the practice of other states
with rules similar to the Fed. R. Civ. P. 37. See Greathouse v. American
Nat’l Bank and Trust Co., 796 S.W.2d 868, 870 (Kentucky 1990) (considering prejudice, warning, and less drastic sanctions).
1. Windbucket Did Not Willfully Delay the Proceedings
It is an abuse of discretion to issue a default sanction unless the
record clearly demonstrates a history of delay or contumacious conduct.
Carter v. City of Memphis, 636 F.2d 159, 161 (6th Cir. 1980). Furthermore, the delay must be the fault of the party rather than his attorney.
Id. In Carter, the plaintiff’s attorney failed to timely respond to discovery requests. Id. Finding the plaintiff blameless, the 6th Circuit reversed an order of dismissal to allow the plaintiff his day in court. Id.

\\server05\productn\S\SFT\26-2\SFT201.txt

2008]

unknown

Seq: 27

21-AUG-09

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT

9:31

347

Like the plaintiff in Carter, Windbucket did not willfully delay the
proceedings. Windbucket was unresponsive to the first order to produce
the logs based on a failure of its attorneys. (R. at 6.) On subsequent
attempts to compel production, Windbucket inadvertently produced the
wrong logs. (R. at 6.) Unfortunately, by the time the district court ordered Windbucket to produce the correct logs or show cause for its failure, Windbucket no longer retained copies of the logs as a result of a
routine pruning of its data retention system. (R. at 6.) Thus,
Windbucket should not be denied its day in court solely as a result of its
attorney’s failure.
2. Romero’s Claim was Not Prejudiced by Windbucket’s Actions
A party suffers prejudice only if the actions of the opposing party
threaten the rightful decision of his case. Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv.,
833 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1987). Thus, even if a party acts deceitfully, “a
party should not be deprived of his opportunity to defend based on factors unrelated to the merits of his case.” Phoceene Sous-Marine, S.A. v.
U.S. Phosmarine, Inc., 682 F.2d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1982). Some courts
have proposed that failure to produce documents as ordered may be evidence of prejudice. Adriana, 913 F.2d at 1412, citing SEC v. Seaboard
Corp., 666 F.2d 414, 417 (9th Cir. 1982). However, failure to produce
documents is only evidence of prejudice when the documents were essential to the “disposition of the case.” SEC, 666 F.2d at 417, citing Norman
v. Young, 422 F.2d 470, 473 (10th Cir. 1970).
In Phoceene Sous-Marine, the court entered a default judgment after
it discovered that a telegram from the defendant’s doctor, used to secure
an extension before trial, was not actually sent by the doctor. Phoceene
Sous-Marine, 682 F.2d at 805. In fact, the telegram was actually sent by
the defendant’s sister and the defendant had even attempted to convince
the doctor to falsely testify that he had sent the telegram. Id. at 804-05.
The district court found that the defendant had willfully deceived the
court and entered a default judgment. Id. The Court of Appeals sympathized that the district court faced a “recalcitrant, deceitful party” and
exercised “admirable restraint.” Id. at 807. Ultimately, however, the
court reversed, holding that a default judgment should not be entered
when the reason for sanctions is a peripheral matter wholly unrelated to
the matters in controversy. Id.
Similar to Phoceene, Winbucket’s alleged failure to produce the internet game server traffic logs is not related to the merits of the case.
The logs would not provide any insight to whether Romero has an actionable invasion of privacy claim. The logs would only help Romero secure
the identity of a potential co-defendant. Thus, the only benefit to Romero would be another person to enforce a potential judgment on. Be-
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cause the documents were not essential to the disposition of the case
against Windbucket, there is no evidence of prejudice. Windbucket
should not be denied its opportunity to defend its case because of a routine, good-faith destruction of documents which do not relate to the merits of the case.
3. The Court Never Warned Windbucket About the Possibility of
Default.
Courts should not enter a default sanction without first demonstrating that the party was adequately warned about the possibility of such a
sanction. Vinci v. Conrail, 927 F.2d 287, 288 (6th Cir. 1991). Moreover,
a warning must be explicit and clear to be considered adequate. Id. at
288. In Vinci, the court found the following warning inadequate: “failure
of counsel to appear at any scheduled pretrial or otherwise comply with
any of the provisions of this Standing Order may result in dismissal, default judgment, or the imposition of sanctions, as may be appropriate.”
Vinci v. Conrail, 927 F.2d at 288. In finding the warning inadequate, the
court noted that the required warning should have stated: “further noncompliance would result in dismissal.” Id. Because the statement was a
boilerplate warning that did not adequately warn the parties that their
conduct may result in dismissal, the court reversed for abuse of discretion. Id.
Additionally, it may be an abuse of discretion to enter a default sanction even if the parties were explicitly warned. In Carter, the district
court’s pretrial order specifically warned the parties that failure to comply could result in dismissal. 636 F.2d at 160. However, despite its explicit warning, the court still reversed because the party’s attorney was
responsible for the delay. Id. at 161.
Here, no such warning was issued. Although Windbucket’s attorneys failed to respond to the first order, the record fails to demonstrate
that the lower court warned Windbucket of the possibility of sanctions.
Moreover, the court failed to warn Windbucket that further non-compliance would result in default. Furthermore, the other errors committed
during the course of discovery were not in response to a court order, and
thus the court did not make any warnings based on those failures. Because Windbucket received absolutely no warning about the possibility
of a default sanction, the court properly refused to enter such sanctions.
4. The District Court Had Not Considered Alternative Sanctions
Before Romero Moved for a Default Sanction
Dismissal or a default judgment “must be a sanction of last, not first,
resort.” Poulis, 747 F.2d at 869. Thus, courts must consider alternative
sanctions before imposing default sanctions. Id. As a result, appellate
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review of a court’s “discretionary choice of a lesser sanction than default
judgment will be very deferential.” Hewlett v. Davis, 844 F.2d 109, 113
(3d Cir. 1988). In Hewlett, a district court chose a monetary sanction
instead of a default sanction for the defendant’s failure to comply with a
discovery order. Id. The court upheld the district court’s decision, finding that that the plaintiff failed to establish “such extreme prejudice to
cause us to interfere with the district court’s considerable discretion in
refusing to order so severe a sanction as default judgment.” Hewlett, 844
F.2d at 113.
This Court should not interfere with the district court’s considerable
discretion in choosing a monetary sanction rather than a default sanction. Here, the district court did not implement or even discuss alternatives before Romero made his motion for a default sanction. (R. at 6.)
Only at that time did the court consider sanctions, and chose, in its discretion, to implement the lesser sanction of ordering Windbucket to pay
reasonable expenses. (R. at 6.)
Furthermore, when an attorney is at fault, courts have increasingly
emphasized directly sanctioning the delinquent lawyer, rather than his
client. Coleman v. Am. Red Cross, 23 F.3d 1091, 1095 (6th Cir. 1994).
Possible attorney sanctions include: “(1) a reprimand by the court, (2) a
finding of contempt, or (3) a prohibition against practicing for a limited
time before the court whose order was neglected or disregarded.” Flaksa
v. Little River Marine Constr. Co., 389 F.2d 885, 889 (5th Cir. 1968).
Furthermore “it seems fairly clear that the judicious use of such measures would tend to promote “attorney compliance in the first instance.”
Id.
Here, the failure to produce the logs was the fault of Windbucket’s
attorneys. As discussed, Windbucket itself did not willfully delay the
proceedings and, therefore, should not be denied its day in court. However, if the court chose to increase sanctions, the attorney sanctions
listed above would be sufficient to prevent future dilatory conduct.
5. Additional Considerations – Meritoriousness of the Defense
Some courts find the likelihood of a defense’s success a compelling
factor in determining whether to issue a default sanction. Poulis, 747
F.2d at 869. In determining whether a defense appears to be meritorious, courts do not use summary judgment standards. Id. A defense is
meritorious when the allegations of the pleadings, if established at trial,
would constitute a complete defense. Poulis, 747 F.2d at 870. Clearly,
the required standard is less than the standard used for summary judgment, and if the facts are sufficient for summary judgment, they must be
sufficient for determining the meritoriousness of the defense.
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Here, the district court granted summary judgment based on
Windbucket’s defense that Romero failed to state a claim for intrusion
upon seclusion and the court of appeals upheld that decision. (R. at 7.)
Even if this Court chose to reverse the summary judgment order, it cannot be denied that Windbucket’s defense that Romero failed to state a
claim appears to be meritorious. Therefore, if this Court chooses to follow the Third Circuit’s test and look to the meritoriousness of the defense, it should still find for Windbucket and refuse to enter a default
sanction.
B. AN ADVERSE INFERENCE INSTRUCTION

IS

INAPPROPRIATE

An “adverse inference” is generally defined as “[a] detrimental conclusion drawn by the fact-finder from a party’s failure to produce evidence that is within the party’s control.” Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed.
2004). To support an adverse inference instruction, Romero must show
all three of the following: “(1) that the party having control over the evidence had an obligation to preserve it at the time it was destroyed; (2)
that the records were destroyed ‘with a culpable state of mind’; and (3)
that the missing evidence is ‘relevant’ to the party’s claim or defense
such that a reasonable trier of fact could find that it would support that
claim or defense.” Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306
F.3d 99, 107-108 (2nd Cir. 2002). Because the documents were irrelevant to Romero’s claim and Windbucket had no obligation to preserve
them, an adverse inference is inappropriate.
1. Windbucket Did Not Have an Obligation to Preserve the Internet
Game Server Traffic Logs
In determining whether a party should have preserved evidence
which was destroyed in the course of a document retention policy, courts
consider: (a) whether the record retention policy is reasonable considering the facts and circumstances surrounding those documents, (b)
whether lawsuits or complaints have been filed frequently concerning
the type of records at issue, and (c) whether the document retention policy was instituted in bad faith. Lewy v. Remington Arms Co., 836 F.2d
1104, 1112 (8th Cir. 1988).
i.

Windbucket’s Record Retention Policy is Reasonable

As discussed above, Windbucket’s document retention policy is
based on the technological limitations and expense associated with storing massive internet game server traffic logs. (R. at 13.) Because the
purpose of these logs is only to diagnose customer issues and track server
utilization, they are not needed for more than two months. (R. at 13.)
Windbucket does not need these logs for any other purpose and, there-
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fore, requiring Windbucket to incur substantial costs to maintain old logs
for an indefinite amount of time is unreasonable.
ii. There is No Evidence of Any Other Complaint Concerning the Type
of Records at Issue
The Record does not contain information about whether any party
other than Romero has filed a complaint and requested the internet
game server traffic logs. It is possible that another party could have filed
a lawsuit, but without evidence, it must be assumed that no other party
has filed suit. While several customers made general complaints about
Voyeur mode, no evidence suggests that a customer has complained formally or informally about Windbucket’s data retention policy. (R. at 5.)
iii. Windbucket’s Record Retention Policy was Not Instituted in Bad
Faith
Where a routine document retention policy has been followed, an intent to destroy the evidence “for the purpose of obstructing or suppressing the truth” must be present to justify an adverse inference
instruction. Lewy, 836 F.2d at 1112. Courts may assume bad faith when
a party has been involved in many similar conflicts and knowingly destroys a particular type of evidence relevant to potential litigation. Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R., 354 F.3d 739, 747 (8th Cir. 2004). In
Stevenson, Union Pacific was involved in several grade crossing collisions and knew that taped conversations were relevant to the litigation.
Id. at 748. Furthermore, in other cases, Union Pacific had preserved
tapes that were beneficial to it. Id. The court found that such conduct
demonstrated an intent to destroy the tapes for the purpose of suppressing evidence. Id. Thus, an adverse inference instruction was
proper. Id.
Here, Windbucket exercised its normal data retention policy with no
intent to destroy evidence for the purpose of obstructing or suppressing
the truth. Unlike Stevenson, no evidence suggests that Windbucket was
involved in similar suits that would put it on notice that internet game
server traffic logs would be relevant. Furthermore, Windbucket had
never retained the logs past the two months for any purpose, and certainly not to aid itself in litigation. Because Windbucket’s data retention
policy is reasonable, and it had no reason to expect that the evidence
would be relevant, Windbucket did not act in bad faith by exercising its
routine document retention policy.
2. WINDBUCKET DID NOT HAVE

A

“CULPABLE STATE

OF

MIND”

A party has a “culpable state of mind” if it destroys evidence in bad
faith. Residential Funding Corp., 306 F.3d at 108. District courts apply
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a case-by-case approach because failures occur along a continuum of
fault, ranging from innocent to intentional. Id.
As noted above, Windbucket did not have an obligation to preserve
the logs, and did not act in bad faith. Therefore, Windbucket could not
have had a “culpable state of mind.” Assuming, arguendo, that
Windbucket should have produced the logs, they were deleted as a result
of a routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information system. (R.
at 6.) Windbucket did not take any affirmative action, and therefore the
failure was completely innocent. Furthermore, because Windbucket’s attorney failed to produce the logs, it cannot be said that Windbucket itself
had a “culpable state of mind.”
3. No Reasonable Trier of Fact Could Find That the Internet Game
Server Traffic Logs Were Relevant to or Supported Romero’s
Claim for Invasion of Privacy Against Windbucket
The party seeking an adverse inference instruction must produce
sufficient evidence that a reasonable trier of fact could find that the unavailable evidence is relevant to the parties’ claim. Residential Funding
Corp., 306 F.3d at 109. Here, the instruction Romero seeks is not related
to the unavailable evidence. Romero requested the district court take
Windbucket’s participation in the alleged invasions of privacy as established for the purposes of this action. (R. at 6.)
No reasonable trier of fact could find that the logs would have established Windbucket’s participation in the alleged invasion of privacy.
The logs would have only been used to establish LEETDUDE’s internet
service provider. Such information would not establish Windbucket’s
participation in the alleged intrusion. Thus an adverse inference instruction is inappropriate.
C. EVEN

IF THE

DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING ROMERO’S MOTION
SANCTIONS, THE ERROR WAS HARMLESS

FOR

Assuming, arguendo, that the District Court should have imposed
sanctions on Romero, its failure to do so was harmless. Courts should
disregard all errors unless it affects any party’s substantial rights. Marshall R. Civ. P. 61. As discussed above, Romero did not suffer any actionable invasion of privacy because he failed to state a claim for intrusion
upon seclusion. Without an actionable invasion of privacy claim, identifying LEETDUDE’s internet service provider would not have altered Romero’s substantial rights. Therefore, this Court should affirm the lower
court’s denial of Romero’s motion for sanctions.
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CONCLUSION
Windbucket did not intrude upon Romero’s seclusion when it created
Voyeur mode. Windbucket did not act intentionally because it did not
participate in LEETDUDE’s entry into PWNED’s virtual mansion. Additionally, Romero failed to show that he had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in Eden or that spying on a virtual character is highly objectionable to a reasonable person. Even if Romero can prove that Windbucket is
responsible, there is no evidence that he endured the requisite anguish
or suffering necessary for a valid claim of intrusion upon seclusion.
Thus, Romero did not present a genuine issue of material fact necessary
to survive summary judgment.
Romero also failed to show that a default sanction is appropriate.
Romero did not provide evidence that Windbucket willfully delayed the
proceedings or that his claim was prejudiced. Furthermore, the district
court never warned Windbucket of the possibility of a default sanction or
considered alternative sanctions. Similarly, an adverse inference instruction is inappropriate because Windbucket maintained a reasonable
data retention policy, did not act with a culpable state of mind, and the
internet game server logs were not relevant to Romero’s claim for invasion of privacy. For the foregoing reasons, Windbucket respectfully requests this Court affirm the decision of the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals of the State of Marshall.
Respectfully Submitted,
_________________________
Attorneys for Respondent
Dated: September 26, 2008
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APPENDIX A:
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652(B)-(E) (1977)
§ 652(B). Intrusion Upon Seclusion
One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the
solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.
§ 652(C). Appropriation Of Name Or Likeness
One who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness
of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy.
§ 652(D). Publicity Given To Private Life
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of
another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if
the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.
§ 652(E). Publicity Placing Person In False Light
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places
the other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the
other for invasion of his privacy, if (a) the false light in which the other
was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the
actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of
the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be
placed.
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APPENDIX B:
Marshall Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 37
Rule 37. Failure to Make Disclosures or to Cooperate in Discovery;
Sanctions
(a) Motion for an Order Compelling Disclosure or Discovery.
(1) In General. On notice to other parties and all affected persons, a
party may move for an order compelling disclosure or discovery. The motion must include a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the person or party failing to make
disclosure or discovery in an effort to obtain it without court action.
(2) Appropriate Court. A motion for an order to a party must be made
in the court where the action is pending. A motion for an order to a nonparty must be made in the court where the discovery is or will be taken.
(3) Specific Motions.
(A) To Compel Disclosure. If a party fails to make a disclosure required by Rule 26(a), any other party may move to compel disclosure and
for appropriate sanctions.
(B) To Compel a Discovery Response. A party seeking discovery may
move for an order compelling an answer, designation, production, or inspection. This motion may be made if:
(i) a deponent fails to answer a question asked under Rule 30 or 31;
(ii) a corporation or other entity fails to make a designation under
Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a)(4);
(iii) a party fails to answer an interrogatory submitted under Rule
33; or
(iv) a party fails to respond that inspection will be permitted—or
fails to permit inspection—as requested under Rule 34.
(C) Related to a Deposition. When taking an oral deposition, the
party asking a question may complete or adjourn the examination before
moving for an order.
(4) Evasive or Incomplete Disclosure, Answer, or Response. For purposes of this subdivision (a), an evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer,
or response must be treated as a failure to disclose, answer, or respond.
(5) Payment of Expenses; Protective Orders.
(A) If the Motion Is Granted (or Disclosure or Discovery Is Provided
After Filing). If the motion is granted—or if the disclosure or requested
discovery is provided after the motion was filed—the court must, after
giving an opportunity to be heard, require the party or deponent whose
conduct necessitated the motion, the party or attorney advising that conduct, or both to pay the movant’s reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney’s fees. But the court must not order
this payment if:
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(i) the movant filed the motion before attempting in good faith to
obtain the disclosure or discovery without court action;
(ii) the opposing party’s nondisclosure, response, or objection was
substantially justified; or
(iii) other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
(B) If the Motion Is Denied. If the motion is denied, the court may
issue any protective order authorized under Rule 26(c) and must, after
giving an opportunity to be heard, require the movant, the attorney filing the motion, or both to pay the party or deponent who opposed the
motion its reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including attorney’s fees. But the court must not order this payment if the motion was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of
expenses unjust.
(C) If the Motion Is Granted in Part and Denied in Part. If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court may issue any protective order authorized under Rule 26(c) and may, after giving an
opportunity to be heard, apportion the reasonable expenses for the
motion.
(b) Failure to Comply with a Court Order.
(1) Sanctions in the District Where the Deposition Is Taken. If the
court where the discovery is taken orders a deponent to be sworn or to
answer a question and the deponent fails to obey, the failure may be
treated as contempt of court.
(2) Sanctions in the District Where the Action Is Pending.
(A) For Not Obeying a Discovery Order. If a party or a party’s officer,
director, or managing agent—or a witness designated under Rule
30(b)(6) or 31(a)(4)—fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery,
including an order under Rule 26(f), 35, or 37(a), the court where the
action is pending may issue further just orders. They may include the
following:
(i) directing that the matters embraced in the order or other designated facts be taken as established for purposes of the action, as the prevailing party claims;
(ii) prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or opposing
designated claims or defenses, or from introducing designated matters in
evidence;
(iii) striking pleadings in whole or in part;
(iv) staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed;
(v) dismissing the action or proceeding in whole or in part;
(vi) rendering a default judgment against the disobedient party; or
(vii) treating as contempt of court the failure to obey any order except an order to submit to a physical or mental examination.
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(B) For Not Producing a Person for Examination. If a party fails to
comply with an order under Rule 35(a) requiring it to produce another
person for examination, the court may issue any of the orders listed in
Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(i)-(vi), unless the disobedient party shows that it cannot
produce the other person.
(C) Payment of Expenses. Instead of or in addition to the orders
above, the court must order the disobedient party, the attorney advising
that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s
fees, caused by the failure, unless the failure was substantially justified
or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
(c) Failure to Disclose, to Supplement an Earlier Response, or to
Admit.
(1) Failure to Disclose or Supplement. If a party fails to provide information or identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is
not allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence on a
motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was substantially
justified or is harmless. In addition to or instead of this sanction, the
court, on motion and after giving an opportunity to be heard:
(A) may order payment of the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the failure;
(B) may inform the jury of the party’s failure; and
(C) may impose other appropriate sanctions, including any of the orders listed in Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(i)-(vi).
(2) Failure to Admit. If a party fails to admit what is requested
under Rule 36 and if the requesting party later proves a document to be
genuine or the matter true, the requesting party may move that the
party who failed to admit pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred in making that proof. The court must so order unless:
(A) the request was held objectionable under Rule 36(a);
(B) the admission sought was of no substantial importance;
(C) the party failing to admit had a reasonable ground to believe
that it might prevail on the matter; or
(D) there was other good reason for the failure to admit.
(d) Party’s Failure to Attend Its Own Deposition, Serve Answers to
Interrogatories, or Respond to a Request for Inspection.
(1) In General.
(A) Motion; Grounds for Sanctions. The court where the action is
pending may, on motion, order sanctions if:
(i) a party or a party’s officer, director, or managing agent—or a person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a)(4)—fails, after being served
with proper notice, to appear for that person’s deposition; or
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(ii) a party, after being properly served with interrogatories under
Rule 33 or a request for inspection under Rule 34, fails to serve its answers, objections, or written response.
(B) Certification. A motion for sanctions for failing to answer or respond must include a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the party failing to act in an effort to
obtain the answer or response without court action.
(2) Unacceptable Excuse for Failing to Act. A failure described in
Rule 37(d)(1)(A) is not excused on the ground that the discovery sought
was objectionable, unless the party failing to act has a pending motion
for a protective order under Rule 26(c).
(3) Types of Sanctions. Sanctions may include any of the orders
listed in Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(i)-(vi). Instead of or in addition to these sanctions, the court must require the party failing to act, the attorney advising that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including
attorney’s fees, caused by the failure, unless the failure was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
(e) Failure to Provide Electronically Stored Information. Absent exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose sanctions under these
rules on a party for failing to provide electronically stored information
lost as a result of the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information system.
(f) Failure to Participate in Framing a Discovery Plan. If a party or
its attorney fails to participate in good faith in developing and submitting a proposed discovery plan as required by Rule 26(f), the court may,
after giving an opportunity to be heard, require that party or attorney to
pay to any other party the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s
fees, caused by the failure.

